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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
RAYMOND B. MAXFIELD, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8854 
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The respondent, Mr. Maxfield, was injured on the· 25th 
day of July, 1955, about eight miles west of Green River on 
U. S. Highway 50-6 at about three o'clock p. m. (R. 23). 
He was a passenger in the rear of a railroad truck 
which was owned and operated by the appellant railroad. 
The driver lost control of the truck which tipped over. The 
respondent sustained injuries to his left shoulder. He was 
taken to the hospital at Price where he was an ambulatory 
patient for approximately eight days. He was under the 
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treatment of Dr. Hubbard who later testified as a witness 
in the case. 
X-rays taken at the time of his injury showed that his 
left shoulder had been dislocated. It was placed back in 
position and his arm immobilized in a sling. After leaving 
the hospital he returned to his home at Green River. He 
was not confined to his bed but was ambulatory. During 
this time he drove his car from Green River to Price to 
keep appointments with Dr. Hubbard. He saw Dr. Hubbard 
for the last time a week before the 1st day of October (R. 
29, 43). 
He remained away from work from the 25th of July to 
the 1st of October. He saw the doctor approximately five or 
six times during this period. When he saw the doctor on the 
last occasion he told him that he was ready to go back to 
work. 
One of the most important questions which arose in 
the case was whether or not the respondent was bound by 
the release which he executed. Prior to the date of signing 
the release the respondent had requested the claim agent 
to come to his home at Green River. There he had requested 
from the Claim Agent an advancement of $200.00, which 
advancement was paid to him. After he had been released 
by the doctor to return to work, he again visited the Claim 
Agent at the Claim Agent's office at Grand Junction and 
discussed with him the settlement of his case. At that time 
he states that the Claim Agent indicated a willingness to 
pay him the sum of $710.00 for a full release. However, 
he stateR that the only reason he signed this release was 
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because the Claim Agent told him that if he did not do so 
he would lose his employment. He also claims that the Claim 
Agent told him that if he attempted to get a lawyer and 
receive advice that he would lose his job. This was all 
denied by the Claim Agent and by Mr. Kanderis who was 
present with the Claim Agent during at least a part of these 
conversations. The respondent at no time testified to any 
facts or alleged facts which would indicate any basis for 
a mutual mistake of fact or for that matter, for a simple 
mistake of fact. His only excuse as determined from his 
testimony for being relieved from the release was alleged 
fraud on the part of the Claim Agent in allegedly forcing 
him to execute the release by a threat that if he did not do 
so or if he attempted to obtain legal advice he would lose 
his job (R. 48). 
The respondent, immediately following the execution 
of the release, returned to his employment and has worked 
steadily ever since said time and was working at the time 
of trial. 
The appellant in effect admits its negligence and ad-
mitted that the respondent was engaged in interstate com-
merce at the time of his injuries. The only question before 
the jury was the validity of the release, and assuming that 
the release was valid, the extent of respondent's injury and 
damages. 
In support of the issue of damages, the respondent 
called as his only witness, not the doctor who had treated 
him, but Dr. Clegg who had been employed by his counsel 
to examine him for the purpose of testifying as a witness 
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in the case. Dr. Clegg did not see the respondent until al-
most two years after his shoulder injury. His examination 
was confined to an examination of the left shoulder. This 
consisted of neurological tests and of x-rays. The doctor 
observed in the x-rays taken approximately two years after 
respondent's injury that there was a calcium deposit on the· 
top of the left shoulder which he believed would cause a 
permanent partial disability of approximately ten percent 
measured at the left shoulder. This disability in its rela-
tionship to the whole person would amount to a disability 
of five percent or less. This disability was clearly related 
to the callous formation (R. 66, 71). 
In examining the respondent neurologically and ex-
amining muscle tone and condition, he concluded that the 
left arm was being used normally in all respects (R. 69). 
He did state that the respondent did complain of some pain 
in the extremes of motion (R. 69). This callous formation, 
the doctor stated, affected the respondent's ability to move 
his left arm in the extremes of motion but not in the usual 
ranges of motion. It was the cause of the permanent partial 
disability. 
The appellant called Dr. Hubbard who treated there-
spondent at the time of his injury until he was released to 
return to his employment. Dr. Hubbard has practiced for 
30 years in the industrial area around Price and Helper, 
during which times he has specialized in general and trau-
matic surgery. He stated that the dislocated shoulder in-
jury sustained by the respondent was relatively common; 
in fact, he has treated about ten a year during the 30 years 
he has practiced in Carbon County. He explained the na-
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ture of the injury and stated that it was easily reduced 
and that the only reason he gave the respondent a sedative 
was to relax him so that the reduction would be made more 
simple. 
He was kept as an ambulatory patient for the purpose 
of observation only, it being the practice to keep middle-
aged persons who have- received injury in a hospital for an 
observation period to prevent blood clots, congested lungs 
and other complications which sometimes accompany in-
juries (R. 109). He stated that placing a dislocated shoul-
der back into position is not very painful and is not compli-
cated. He thought that the reduction had been very suc-
cessful and that the respondent had made an uneventful 
and completely successful recovery (R. 110). 
The doctor produced in court the x-rays which he had 
taken at the time of respondent's injury. He described a 
callous formation existing on the top of respondent's left 
shoulder and stated that such callous formations are com-
mon in people over 40, or even in their late 30s, and that it 
is in the nature of an arthritic change. He compared the 
x-rays taken by Dr. Clegg and the- x-rays taken at the Price 
hospital and explained that the callous formation shown 
in Dr. Clegg's pictures was also present in the x-rays taken 
at the time of respondent's injury and that allowing for 
the difference in the developing of the x-rays and allowing 
for the angle at which the pictures were taken, the callous 
formation shown in the x-rays taken at the time of respon-
dent's injury and the x-rays taken by Dr. Clegg two years 
later, were identical both in position and development (R. 
112, 113). 
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The doctor stated that before he released the respon-
dent to return to work he had him move his arms in all the 
different ranges of motion and explained that he could do 
so without disability of any kind. When he was released 
by the doctor to return to work he was not limited to light 
duty but was released for all-purpose duty (R. 114). 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the respondent moved 
to amend the complaint, allegedly to conform the complaint 
to the proof in connection with the alleged evidence relative 
to a mutual mistake of fact. The court permitted this 
amendment over appellant's objection (R. 128). 
The case was submitted to the jury on the court's in-
structions and the jury returned a verdict in favor of re-
spondent in the sum of $5,540.00, less $710.00, the amount 
paid at the time a release was taken. Appellant made a 
motion for a new trial, which motion was denied. From 
the errors complained of and the denial of the court to grant 
appellant's motion for a new trial, the appellant takes this 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE 
QUANTUM OF PROOF REQUIRED TO SET 
ASIDE A RELEASE. 
POINT II. 
rrHE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN PERMITTING THE RESPONDENT 
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TO AMEND AND IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY ON MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT. 
(a) It was error to permit respondent to cross 
examine Mr. Stephen beyond the s·cope of 
the direct examination and beyond the issues 
formulated in the case. 
(b) The uncontradicted evidence fails to show 
that the parties to the release executed the 
release because of mutual mistake of fact. 
(c) The undisputed evidence shows that respon-
dent did not sustain a permanent disability 
as a proximate result of his injury. 
P·OINT III. 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSABLE 
ERROR IN FAILING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 7. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN INSTRUCTING T'HE JURY ON THE 
QUANTUM OF PROOF REQUIRED TO SET 
ASIDE A RELEASE. 
The appellant requested the court to instruct the jury 
that plaintiff had the burden of proving by clear and con-
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vincing evidence that he was entitled to be relieved of the 
release which he had signed. The court after some consid-
eration determined that the proper rule on the issue of 
quantum of proof was a mere preponderance of the evi-
dence and so instructed the jury. To the court's failure to 
give appellant's request and to the court's instructions given 
on the question of quantum of proof, the appellant duly 
excepted. The issue here is simply which quantum of proof 
should be applied in a Federal Employers' Liability Act in 
the State of Utah. 
This matter was before this court in Kirchgestner v. 
Denver and Rio Grande Railroad CO'mpany, decided May 
17, 1950, 218 P. 2d 685. In that case plaintiff sought to 
recover damages for permanent and disabling injuries in-
volving his lower back. Ten days after the alleged mishap 
he executed a release for $135.00. While plaintiff had been 
boarding a car, the grabiron which he grasped came loose, 
causing him to fall to the ground where he struck his back 
against a boulder. He felt no ill effects until the next day 
when his back hurt him and he consulted Dr. Smith at 
Salida. Dr Smith took X-rays which were negative and 
gave the plaintiff some pills for his nerves. Four or five 
days later after continued pain, the plaintiff saw a Dr. 
Fuller at the same hospital who assured him that he would 
be "all right.'' Thereafter, plaintiff saw the Claim Agent 
at Pueblo who called Dr. Fuller and received assurance that 
plaintiff was physically able to return to work. The Claim 
Agent asked the plaintiff if he was ready to return to work 
and received an affirmative reply. A release \Vas thereupon 
executed which \Vas in the exact form as the one before this 
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court. The plaintiff subsequently claimed he was unable 
to do his work and discontinued the same, alleging that his 
inability to work was caused by pain in his back. He was 
not working at the time of the law suit. The court in-
structed the jury on mutual mistake of fact and instructed 
the jury that it could set aside the release if it found a 
mutual mistake by a preponderance of the evidence. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah in reviewing 
this assignment of error said in its first opinion: 
"We are unable to review this assignment of 
error because the defendant did not take an excep-
tion to the instruction given to the jury. (Citing 
cases.) Before leaving this matter, however, we 
think the following observation in regard to the 
nature and proof of a mutual mistake of fact may 
prove helpful in cases involving the setting aside of 
releases which may hereafter arise. * * * Since 
mutual mistake of fact consists of a belief by both 
parties that a certain fact exists whereas in reality 
it does not exist or is not true, both the belief of the 
parties in the supposed true fact and existence of 
the true fact must be proved by the same degree of 
proof. The mistake is a unit circumstance. One of 
its prongs cannot be proved by a mere preponder-
ance of evidence and other by clear, unequivocal and 
convincing evidence. Hence in a jurisdiction requir-
ing mutual mistake of fact to be proved: by clear, 
unequivocal and convincing evidence, (which the 
author of this opinion thinks is required in this jur-
isdiction) if there is no doubt that both parties con-
tracted in the light of a belief that a certain sit-
uation or condition was true and it is claimed by 
one party that their belief was in fact a mistaken 
belief, the latter must prove by clear, unequivocal 
and convincing evidence that the situation or condi-
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tion in reliance on which the contract was made, 
was at the time of making thereof different from 
that which both. parties supposed or believed. And 
if a jury is to determine whether the true fact is in 
reality different from what the parties mutually 
believed, such jury must find that fact by clear un-
equivocal and convincing evidence, and should be so 
instructed." 
The court, however, did not reverse the case until it 
was subsequently heard on petition for rehearing, reported 
in 233 P. 2d 699 under date of June 19, 1951. Justice Wolfe 
in writing the unanimous opinion said: 
"The appellant's petition for rehearing was 
granted in this case to allow us to consider on its 
merits the question whether the trial court erred 
in denying the appellant's request that the jury be 
instructed that in order to avoid the release executed 
by the respondent, he must prove a mutual mistake 
of fact by 'clear and unequivocal' evidence. Instead, 
the court charged the jury that a mutual mistake of 
fact need only be proved by a 'preponderance of the 
evidence.' For the facts of the case, see our original 
opinion, Utah~ 218 P. 2d 685. 
"Upon the authorities cited in our opinion 
granting the petition for rehearing~ Utah, 225 P. 
2d 754, we conclude that the lower court erred in the 
particular above mentioned and that such error 
necessitates a reversal of the case for a new trial. 
It would serve no useful purpose to further discuss 
those authorities here." 
And again: 
"We had occasion recently to examine the ex-
pression. 'clear and convincing' evidence. See 
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Greener v. Greener, Utah, 212 P. 2d 194, 205. There 
we remarked that 'for a matter to be clear and con-
vincing to a particular mind it must at least have 
reached the point where there remains no serious or 
substantial doubt as to the correctness of the con-
clusion. A mind which was of the opinion that it 
was convinced and yet which entertained, not a 
slight, but a reasonable doubt as to the correctness 
of its conclusion, would seem to be in a state of con-
fusion.' 
"Further, we said, 'That proof is convincing 
which carries with it, not only the power to persuade 
the mind as to the probable truth or correctness of 
the fact it purports to prove, but has the element of 
clinching such truth or correctness. Clear and con-
vincing proof clinches what might be otherwise only 
probable to the mind.' See Southwestern Bell Tele-
phone Co. v. City of San Antonio, Texas, D. C. Texas, 
4 F. Supp. 570, 573, where it was stated that 
proof is not 'clear and convincing' if the court en-
tertains a reasonable doubt. 
"It is pointed out by the respondent that in the 
federal cases relied upon by us as authority for hold-
ing the trial court in error, the juries were required 
to find mutual mistake by 'clear and convincing' 
evidence and not by 'clear and unequivocal' evidence. 
Respondent argues that the word 'unequivocal,' im-
posed upon him a greater burden than do the words, 
'clear and convincing,' and hence the lower court 
was justified in rejecting the appellant's requested 
instruction. While perhaps it would be the better 
practice in cases brought under the Federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. A. 51 et seq., to in-
struct in the terms employed by the federal courts, 
the use of the word 'unequivocal,' is not erroneous. 
The dictionary definition of the word, 'unequivocal,' 
is as follows: 'Not doubtful; not ambiguous; clear; 
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sincere.' Thus if the word unequivocal means not 
doubtful, not ambiguous or clear as employed in this 
context, that term cast no burden upon the respon-
dent which was not already upon him by virtue of 
the word 'clear.' We believe the Federal rule re-
quiring 'clear and convincing' evidence is prefer-
able." 
It should also be noted that Instruction No. 2.6 of Jury 
Instruction Forms for Utah cites the Kirckgestner case as 
authority for the following instruction: 
"BURDEN OF PROOF IN AVOIDING RELEASE 
"Concerning the release, Exhibit A, which (if 
you find that it) was voluntarily signed by plaintiff 
for a valuable consideration under such circum-
stances that the parties understood that a release 
was being agreed upon, it would be binding upon 
the plaintiff, and constitute a complete defense to 
this action. The burden of proving the invalidity of 
the release is upon the plaintiff. In order to avoid 
its effect (he) must establish i~ invalidity by a de-
gree of proof somewhat higher than the preponder-
ance or greater weight of the evidence heretofore 
defined and which is applicable to other issues in 
this case. Before the release may be avoided he must 
establish by evidence that is clear and convincing 
that at the time of signing it he did not comprehend 
the nature of the release and its consequences (or 
that his ""ill 'Ya.s overcome by duress or undue in-
fluence)." 
The court in its first opinion, in the K'lrchgest:ner case, 
supra, referred to Callen v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 332 U. 
S. 625, 68 S. Ct. 296, wherein the Supreme Court of the 
United States had considered a question of release. The 
Supreme Court of Utah construed that case as holding in 
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conformity with its opinion requiring clear and convinci:ng 
evidence to set aside a release. 
The Callen case arose under the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act. Plaintiff complained of a severe and perma-
nent back injury. Defendant took a release from the plain-
tiff similar to the one in the instant case for $250.00. At the 
trial plaintiff did not claim fraud but testifed he signed 
a release in reliance on the Claim Agent's assurance that 
"there was nothing wrong" and that he "could get back to 
the job." At the trial it appeared from his testimony that 
both he and the Claim Agent were mistaken ; that he in fact 
had a permanent and serious injury and could not work. 
The trial court instructed the jury as follows: 
"The release, as I have told the attorneys for 
both sides, I do not consider binding insofar as it 
applies to his permanent injuries, because the Penn-
sylvania Railroad certainly didn't know he was per-
manently injured * * * " 
The Circuit Court of Appeals in the Third Circuit re-
versed the case on the grounds of this instruction and the 
Supreme Court of the United States in commenting on said 
fact said: 
"The Circuit Court of Appeals, quite rightly we 
think, construed the charge of the District Judge as 
withdrawing the question of validity of the release 
from the jury and said : 'This was palpable error 
under the facts relating to the release and entirely 
aside from the Court's incorrect assumption that 
there was no dispute about the permanancy of the 
injuries.' " 
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The c·ourt then stated as follows: 
"We are urged, however, to decide in this case 
that the release was properly disregarded by the 
trial court upon the ground that the burden should 
not be on one who attacks a release, to show grounds 
of mutual mistake or fraud, but should rest upon 
the one who pleads such a contract, to prove the ab-
sence of those grounds. It is not contended that 
this is or ever has been the law; rather, it is con-
tended that it should be the law, at least as to rail-
road cases.'' 
The Court, however, in refusing to change the law as it 
then existed, said : 
"If the Congress were to adopt a policy depriv-
ing settlements of litigation of their prima facie 
validity, it might also make compensation for in-
juries more certain and the amounts thereof less 
speculative. But until the Congress changes the 
statutory plan, the releases of railroad employees 
stand on the same basis as the releases of others. 
One who attacks a settlement must bear the burden 
of showing that the contract he has made is tainted 
with invalidity, either by fraud practiced upon him 
or by a mutual mistake under which both parties 
acted." 
The United States Supreme Court finally, by majority 
opinion, sustained the Third Circuit in the CaUen case with 
four judges dissenting. The dissenting judges were Black, 
Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge. These four thought that 
the case should be reversed and that the railroad should 
have the burden of proving that the release was not ob-
tained by fraud or that there was not mutual mistake of 
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fact. This is the present rule in admiralty cases~ Two; of 
the dissenting judges are now deceased. 
The Third Circuit, which was sustained in the Callen 
case, supra, specifically held on the question quantum of 
proof as follows: 
"Prior to charging appellant's points above 
quoted, the District Judge had advised the jUry that 
the release was not binding in so far as it applied 
to appellee's permanent injuries. This was palpable 
error under the facts relating to the release and en-
tirely aside from the Court's incorrect assumption 
that there was no dispute about the permanency of 
the injuries. Thereafter, in charging appellant's 
points, though the Judge made a conscientious effort 
to remedy the situation, he failed to tell the jury that 
clear and convincing evidence of mutual mistake of 
a rna terial fact was needed in order to set the release 
aside. That type of instruction was especially im-
portant in view of the confusion which had been 
created over the status of the release. Had a point 
for charge covering this been among the fourteen 
submitted on behalf of the appellant, it probably 
would have solved the difficulty, but the failure to 
suggest such point does not excuse the omission from 
the charge of the law of that phase of the case which 
should have been charged of the court's own mo-
tion." 
It thus is clear that the Callen case clearly approved the 
type instruction requested in the instant case. It is also 
clear that the Utah Supreme Court has done likewise in 
the Kirchgestner case, which is cited herein. 
The respondent in effect is urging that the trial court 
in the instant case should overrule the United States Su-
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preme. Court and the Utah Supreme Court because of the 
Dice case, infra, and two subsequent Federal Circuit Court 
cases. A consideration of these cases does not justify plain-
tiff's contention. 
In Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Com-
pany, decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1951, 
the facts were as follows : 
The plaintiff, a railroad fireman, was seriously injured 
when the engine jumped the track. The defendant plead 
a release for $924.63. The plaintiff claimed fraud in the 
inducement to the executiQn of the release. The jury 
awarded $25,000 to plaintiff. The Ohio trial court set the 
verdict aside, holding that (1) Ohio, not Federal law con-
trolled, and (2) under the law petitioner was bound by his 
release even though he had been induced to sign by false 
statements, and (3) under Ohio l?w the factual issues in-
volving a release should be decided by the court. The case 
went to the Ohio Supreme Court which sustained with one 
judge dissenting. The United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari. That court said: 
"We granted certiorari because the decision of 
the Supreme Court of Ohio appeared to deviate from 
previous decisions of this Court that federal law 
governs cases arising under the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act. 342 U. S. 811, 72 S. Ct. 59." 
On the second question the court said: 
''We hold that the correct federal rule is that 
announced by the Court of Appeals of Summit 
County, Ohio, and the dissenting judge in the Ohio 
Supreme Court-a release of rights under the Act 
is void when the employee is induced to sign it by 
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the deliberately false and material statements of the 
railroad's authorized representatives made to de-
ceive the employee as to the contents of the release." 
On the third question the court said: 
"The trial judge and the Ohio Supreme C()urt 
erred in holding that petitioner's rights were to ·be 
determined by Ohio law and in taking away peti-
tioner's verdict when the issues of fraud had been 
submitted to the jury on conflicting evidence and 
determined in petitioner's favor." 
The court then reversed and remanded the case, with four 
judges dissenting. 
It will be noted that the majority of the court made 
no mention of the problem involving the question of quan-
tum of proof, even though the Ohio Supreme Court referred 
to the problem in its opinion and said: 
"With respect to the burden of proof on this 
question in the federal courts, it may be observed 
that in the Callen case, the Circuit Court of Appeals, 
in reversing the District Court, stated that 'evidence 
in order to void the release, had to be clear, une-
quivocal, and convincing.' 3 Cir., 162 F. 2d 832-833. 
This is the precise rule with respect to burden of 
proof adopted by the trial judge in his finding in the 
instant case. The decision of the Circuit Court of 
Appeals in the Callen case was affirmed by the 
Supreme Court of the United States." 
The four dissenting judges dissented on questions not 
material to the point here considered. During the course 
of their dissent they said : 
"Such proof of fraud need be only by a pre-
ponderance of the relevant evidence. See Union Pa-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
cific Railroad Company v. Harris, 158 U. S. 326, 15 
S. Ct. 843, 39 L. Ed. 1003." 
We have read the opinion in the Union Pacific case and 
are unable to find anything therein which even remotely 
deals with the question here at hand. 
Finally the dissenting judges said : 
"Moreover, we cannot say with confidence that 
the Ohio trial judge applied the Federal standard 
correctly. He duly recognized that 'the Federal law 
controls as to the validity of a release pleaded and 
proved in bar of the action, and the burden of show-
ing that the alleged fraud vitiates the contract or 
compromise or release rests upon the party attacking 
the release.' And he made an extended analysis of 
the relevant circumstances of the release, concluding, 
however, that there was no 'clear, unequivocal and 
convincing evidence' of fraud. Since these elusive 
words fail to assure us that the trial judge followed 
the Federal test and did not require some larger 
quantum of proof, we would return the case for 
further proceedings on the sole question of fraud 
in the release. 72 S. Ct. 312." 
It must be assumed that the majority of the court did 
not agree \vith the four dissenting judges on this point. 
Also, it must be assumed as axiomatic that dissenting opin-
ions are not the law. 
During- oral argun1ent on appellant's motion for a new 
tria], counsel for respondent cited to the court two Federal 
deci~ions which \vere decided subsequent to the Dice case. 
The first was Pur1'is v. Pennsylra.nia Railway Company, 
198 F. 2d 631. This case arose in Pennsylvania. Plaintiff 
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sustained injuries consisting of a bruised rib and nose 
laceration. He signed a release for $45.00. He claimed 
mutual mistake of fact and fraud in the inducement. The 
jury found that plaintiff did not know what he was sign-
ing and gave a verdict for $1,000.00. The Third Cir?uit 
in reviewing the case took upon itself the collateral and 
moot issue of the quantum of proof required to set aside 
a release. The court said : 
"We are satisfied that if and when the problem 
is squarely before the Supreme Court the rule pro-
nounced will be in accord with Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's above quoted language and therefore, in 
fairness to the district judges of this circuit and to 
ourselves, we adopt that test for this circuit in ap-
plicable instances." 
In Camerlin v. New York Central Railroad Company, 
199 F. 2d 698, the lower court in New York granted a sum-
mary judgment for defendant on a release case brought 
under the F. E. L. A. The case was appealed to the First 
Circuit where the case was reversed. In rendering its opin-
ion the First Circuit said: 
"In support of the judgment below, the defen-
dant relies particularly upon Rader v. Lehigh Valley 
R. R. Co., 3 Cir., 1928, 26 F. 2d 73, and Merwin v. 
New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. Co., 2 Cir., 
1933, 62 F. 2d 803. These cases bear considerable 
factual resemblance to the case at bar. In the Rader 
case, the appellate court sustained the trial judge 
in directing a verdict for the defendant, and in the 
Merwin case the appellate court reversed a judg-
ment for the plaintiff on the ground that a verdict 
for defendant should have been directed. But in 
each the court was applying the older rule that a 
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release cannot be avoided except upon evidence which 
is 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing.' This may 
have been the rule at one time but, at least as ap-
plied to cases under the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act, we take the federal rule now to be, as was indi-
cated in the recent case of Purvis v. Pennsylvania 
R. R. Co., 3 Cir., 1952, 198 F. 2d 631, that it is 
enough if the employee establishes, by a preponder-
ance of the relevant evidence, the facts invalidating 
the release." 
It will be noted that the opinion relating to quantum 
of proof in the Camerlin case was itself unnecessary to the 
opinion and therefore little more than dicta. Furthermore, 
the opinion it relies on to establsh the rule, viz., in the . 
Purvis case, is obviously dicta. Finally, the dicta in the 
Purvis case follows the dicta in the minority opinion in the 
Dice case, supra. 
Against the minority opinion in the Dice case, and the 
subsequent dicta opinions in the two Circuit Court cases 
cited herein, stands the majority and unoverruled opinion 
of the United States Supreme Court in the Callen case and 
the unanimous unoverruled decision in the Utah Supreme 
Court in the K irchgestner case, all of which cases are con-
sidered herein. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN PERMITTING THE RESPONDENT 
TO AMEND AND IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY ON MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT. 
(a) It 1caB error to pcrrnit respondent to cross 
e;1~a1ninc Afr. Stephen beyond tke scope of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
the direct examination and beyond the issues 
formulated in the case. 
The issues framed by the parties in their pleadings 
and by the pretrial order limited the question on the release 
to the matter stated in respondent's Reply to the Amended 
Answer which is as follows : 
"Defendant obtained said release and settle-
ment from plaintiff by threatening plaintiff with 
the loss of his job if he refused to accept said settle-
ment; that said representation by defendant was 
false and that plaintiff relied on said representation; 
* * * " 
During the examination of both respondent and the 
witness Stephen, this was the only issue considered. How-
ever, on cross examination of Mr. Stephen, Mr. Roberts 
immediately digressed from the issue and said: 
"Q. And you know the measure of damages 
which should be paid under the law, don't you? 
"A. No. 
"Mr. Ashton: Wait just a minute please. If 
the court please, we object to what the measure of 
damages is. In this case there is only one question, 
whether or not he fraudulently misrepresented what 
this man stated. 
"Q. (By Mr. Roberts) You know that one of 
the elements is pain and suffering, don't you? 
"Mr. Ashton: Object to that, if the Court 
please, as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial. 
The only question here is whether or not a false 
misrepresentation was made." 
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This objection was overruled and Mr. Roberts then 
at some length asked the witness about pain and suffering, 
loss of bodily function, loss of earnings, both past and 
future and related matters which bad no possible probative 
value on the issue of alleged fraudulent misrepresentation. 
How the matters. related by Mr. Roberts' cross-examination 
could possibly bear on this issue is beyond counsel's com-
prehension. Such matters do relate to possible mutual mis-
take of fact. 
(b) The uncontradicted evidence fails to show 
that the parties to the release executed the 
release because of mutual mistake of fact. 
Even if mutual mistake of fact had been plead, the 
foregoing evidence has only a possible relevancy. That 
possibility depends upon whether or not there is probative 
evidence which proves or tends to prove there was a mutual 
mistake of fact upon ll'hich both parties relied. 
This proposition of law is stated in the Kirchgestner 
case, supra. wherein the Utah Supreme Court said: 
''Since mutual mistake of fact consists of a 
belief by both parties that a certain fact exists 
whereas in reality it does not exist or is not true, 
both the belief of the parties in the supposed true 
fact and existence of the true fact must be proved 
by the same degree of proof. The mistake is a unit 
circumstance. One of its prongs cannot be proved 
by a mere preponderance of evidence and other by 
clear, unequhTocal and convincing evidence. Hence 
in a jurisdiction requiring mutual mistake of fact to 
be proved by clear, unequivocal and convincing evi-
dence, (which the author of this opinion thinks is 
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required in this jurisdiction) if there is no doubt 
that both parties contracted in the light of a belief 
that a certain situation or condition was true and 
it is claimed by one party that their belief was in 
fact a mistaken belief, the latter must prove by clear, 
unequivocal and convincing evidence that the situa-
tion or condition in reliance on which the contract 
was made, was at the time of making thereof dif-
ferent from that which both parties supposed or 
believed." 
The respondent stated that at the time he entered into 
the release he did so because he felt that if he drid not do 
so he would lose his job. This was his reason for signing 
the release. No one claims that this was a mutual mistake 
of fact. To the contrary, it was claimed that this was a 
fraudulent misrepresentation, which by its very terminology 
eliminates mutual mistake of fact. The respondent stated 
that he was ready to go back to work and that the doctor 
had released him for that purpose. He did not claim that 
anyone was mistaken in this regard ; in fact, he continued 
to work steadily for over two years and was working at 
the time of trial. Therefore, this could not constitute a 
mistake of fact, let alone a mutual mistake. But, even 
should we assume that the respondent was mistaken as 
to the facts of his injury, where is the evidence that the 
railroad was mistaken? The fact that Mr. Stephen knew 
or did not know that under the law a court or jury could 
award damages for lost wages, pain and suffering, loss of 
bodily function and so forth does not prove or tend to prove 
that the railroad was laboring under a mistake as to the 
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extent of respondent's. injuries. The only questions put 
to Mr. Stephen relative to mistake were the following: 
"Q. And as a matter of fact when you made 
this settlement, you didn't know and you felt-Strike 
that. At the time you made this settlement it was 
your idea that he had no permanent disability, wasn't 
it? 
"A. As far as I know that is right. 
"Q. Well, that was the basis you made the set-
tlement on, wasn't it? 
"A. I made the settlement on the basis of the 
complete injuries." 
How could any fact finder find from such evidence that 
this constituted mutual mistake of fact upon which the 
parties relied in making a settlement. The fact is, the fore-
going testimony clearly shows there ~vas no mutual mistake 
upon which the parties relied. 
In the K irchgestner case, supra, the claim agent called 
the doctor who advised that the plaintiff was all right and 
that he could go back to work. Relying on this, the claim 
agent and the plaintiff executed a release. Subsequent evi-
dence indicated that the plaintiff \vas not all right and that 
he could not continue his \York. 
So far as the instant case is concerned, the claim agent 
settled the case relying on respondent's representation that 
he was ready and able to continue his employment. The 
undisputeo evidence sho\YS that this was not a mistake but 
was and is the fact. There was no discussion about perma· 
nent or temporary disability. The discussion allegedly 
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centered around false representations about employment 
and the effect of consulting a lawyer. 
(c) The undisputed evidence shows that respon-
dent did not sustain a permanent disability 
as a proximate result of his injury. 
It is claimed by respondent that the alleged mutual 
mistake of fact related to the permanency of respondent's 
disability resulting from the pain and limitation of motion 
caused by a callous formation on the top of his left shoulder. 
Dr. Clegg testified that respondent had a callous for-
mation, as diagnosed from X-ray readings, on the top of 
his shoulder. This, and only this he believed, would cause 
a 10% permanent disability measured at the shoulder. This 
disability would be reduced to something less than 5% of 
the person, and would be minimal. He had not seen the 
patient until almost two years after the injury. The X-rays 
which he interpreted were taken almost two years after 
the incident. He had not seen X-rays taken at the time of 
the injury. 
Dr. Hubbard testified on behalf of the appellant. He 
had treated respondent. He saw him on the day of his in-
jury and placed his shoulder back into position. He also 
saw X-rays taken that same day. These X-rays, he reported, 
showed the callous formation referred to by Dr. Clegg in 
the same position and in the same stage of growth as the 
callous observed by Dr. Clegg in the X -rays taken two years 
later. 
No doctor was called to refute this testimony. It stands 
undisputed. It therefore appears from the undisputed ex-
pert testimony that respondent's permanent disability, if 
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any, stems from a callous formation on his shoulder which 
existed at the time he was injured, and which therefore 
could not have been caused by his injury. 
It is no answer to Dr. Hubbard's testimony to say that 
respondent's lawyers and the jurors can make a different 
interpretation of the X-rays than the expert witness. Coun-
sel recalls that Mr. Roberts so advised the jury by arguing 
that an X-ray was like any other photograph and that they 
could make their own interpretation. This is not the law. 
The rule is well stated in Wigmore on evidence, Vol. III, 
page 192 as follows: 
"It follows that an x-ray photograph (of a con-
dition of the human body, at any rate) should not 
be offered and shown to the jury 'Without the testi-
mony of a witness qualified to interpret." 
In Russell v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co. of Utah, 53 
Utah 457; 17 4 P. 633, the Utah Supreme Court passed on 
this question and said: 
"It is next contended that the court erred in 
admitting in evidence certain radiographs or x-ray 
photographs, showing the condition of plaintiff's 
hip and hip joint. It is insisted that the radiographs 
had a tendency· to mislead the jurors who were 
merely laymen, and thus possessed no knowledge 
respecting the injuries to the bone or the hip or hip 
joint. If the radiographs had been introduced for 
the purpose indicated by counsel, there would be 
much force to their contention. A jury of laymen 
possessing no kno,vledge nor experience respecting 
the bones and injuries thereto might easily be mis-
led by a mere x-ray photograph or radiograph by 
which at the best n1erely the outline of the bone can 
be shown. The radiographs were, however, not in-
troduced for the purpose indicated by counsel. They 
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were used by the doctors in illustrating their evi-
dence, and were fully explained, and were intro-
duced in evidence only as affording a fuller and 
clearer understanding by the jury of the doctors' 
testimony respecting the condition of plaintiff's in-
jured hip and hip joint. The court committed no 
error in receiving the radiographs for the purpose 
for which they were received and used." 
Dr. Hubbard was a disinterested witness who had 
treated the respondent over a period of time to the respon-
dent's complete satisfaction. He is not employed by the 
appellant but by the respondent's hospital association. His 
testimony with reference to the x-rays was not disputed. 
Such evidence cannot he disregarded. The rule is well stated 
in In Re Miller's Will, 90 P. 1002 at page 1006 as follows: 
"It is firmly established everywhere that, as a 
general rule, when a disinterested witness, who is 
in no way discredited by other evidence, testified 
to a fact within the knowledge of such witness, 
which is not in itself improbable, or in conflict with 
other evidence, the witness is to be believed, and the 
facts so given are to be taken as legally established. 
Kavanagh v. Wilson, 70 N.Y. 177; Evans v. George, 
80 Ill. 51; In re John Immel's Estate, 59 Wis. 249, 
18 N. W. 182." 
POINT III. 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSABLE 
ERROR IN FAILING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 7. 
Appellant requested the court to give Instruction No. 
7 which was as follows: 
"You are instructed that one of the issues raised 
in this case is whether the release executed and given 
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by plaintiff to the defendant Railroad was obtained 
through alleged misrepresentatio~s made by defen-
dant's agent Stephens. 
"In that connection you are to consider only 
the evidence relating to plaintiff's claim that defen-
dant's agent represented that if plaintiff did not 
execute and deliver the release he would lose his job. 
"You are not called upon to decide and must 
completely disregard and eliminate from your de-
liberations any consideration as to the adequacy or 
inadequacy, fairness or unfairness of the considera-
tion paid for said release. The court holds as a 
matter of law that a valid legal consideration was 
paid for said release and the only question before 
you is whether said release was procured through 
misrepresentations as aforesaid." (R. 152). 
The court refused to give the above instruction. Coun-
sel particularly felt that an instruction similar to the one 
requested was applicable and pertinent to the case at hand 
because of the evidence which had been received over coun-
sel's objection relating to elements which are ordinarily 
considered by fact finders in determining what is a reason-
able amount to pay for one who has sustained injury. With 
such evidence before it, it 'Yas of course tempting for the 
jury to determine whether or not the amount agreed upon 
between the respondent and the appellant railroad in the 
release was a fair amount and an amount ,,·hich they would 
have found had they been determining the case. This, of 
course, was not the issue. The issue 'vhich "·as originally 
framed was 'vhether or not the respondent had been fraud-
ulently induced to enter into the release and as subsequently 
amended vvhether or not there had been a mutual mistake 
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of fact. The jury should not have been permitted without 
instruction from the court to speculate about these facts 
and determine what they would consider a fair settlement 
for the injuries alleged. 
The error became particularly apparent during the 
argument to the jury. Mr. Black on two occasions told the 
jury that they could find what was a fair amount in de-
termining the issues in this case. We submit that this was 
a palpable error and deprived the defendant of a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons given we submit that the court should 
reverse said case and order a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Clifford L. Ashton, 
For VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
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